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Return of the Proconsul:
Unification of the U.S. Executive Branch at the Operational Level
to Produce Unity of Effort in Overseas National Security Programs and Operations

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Executive Summary

Title: Return of the Proconsul: Unification of the U.S. Executive Branch at the Operational Level to Produce Unity of Effort in Overseas National Security Programs and Operations

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Thesis: The U.S. Executive Branch should change its fundamental structure at the operational level to achieve integrated planning and regional unity of effort through unified regional executors to synchronize national security programs and operations abroad.

Discussion: The U.S. has committed itself to fighting a long war against the forces of global instability. To fight this war, the President has transformed the traditional strategy of military and economic domination to one of partnership and engagement with the international community. To succeed in this war, the U.S. must synchronize all its instruments of national power at the operational level. Currently, only entities in the U.S. Executive Branch with the capability to synchronize efforts within global regions reside in the Department of Defense Unified Combatant Commands. All other departments and agencies are adept at generating discussion and policy options, but are not capable of projecting capabilities overseas. This is not a new problem. The U.S. has struggled with the lack of unified action throughout its history. Numerous attempts have been made to massage the means by which interagency coordination is made. These attempts range from changes in the National Security Council, to the creation of unique command structures in Vietnam. None have been wholly successful and most relied solely upon the good-will of individual personalities. The problem lies not in the proper way to coordinate between elements in the Executive Branch structure, but in the structure itself and its inability to adapt. At the operational level, the U.S. Executive Branch must reorganize under Unified Regional Executors with authority and responsibility over all operations and programs within their region. This change would require a shift from the current emphasis on functional lines to regional ones. It would also require the expansion of the concept of joint componentcy to all departments and agencies that contribute to national security overseas. Most importantly, this change would require a modification to how departments and agencies are funded and a reallocation of resources based upon national priorities.

Conclusion: The structure needed to fight a long war against the forces of instability must provide several capabilities. It must provide single direction, enforce the primacy of the political effort over military power, achieve unity of effort, and promote the adaptation of attitudes and capabilities across military and civilian components. The current U.S. government organization does not provide for these. In the uncertain world of the future, the only variable that the U.S. government can control with certainty is how it organizes itself; the enemy can affect virtually every other facet. While no structure will guarantee victory, no amount of good-will will overcome the flaws of an unmanageable structure. Failing to get the structure right will undermine all other efforts, while successful organization will provide incalculable benefits to ensure U.S. national security is maintained abroad.

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Preface

As a military professional, I am frequently asked to administer programs and conduct operations which are not traditional military missions. I have asked, "Why am I performing these jobs when surely there is some other agency in the Federal Government tasked specifically to do them?" Invariably, the answer from seniors and peers is, "the interagency is broken." As an American, I have seen the overwhelming amount of creativity, resources, and energy the U.S. can throw at a problem, and yet, it seems the U.S. cannot unify its efforts when more than one agency or department is involved in an operation. This problem, as I see it, has not been forced upon the U.S. from an outside power; we have created it ourselves. If this is true, we can change our organization and mindset to remove the artificial restraints we have placed on ourselves. This paper explores some of the attempts made in recent U.S. history to improve interagency cooperation and proposes a theoretically simple solution to promote unity of effort at the operational level of overseas national security programs and operations.

Throughout the development of this paper, I have used the members of my Command and Staff College conference group as sounding boards for ideas. I am very grateful for their patience, thoughtfulness, and creativity. Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. J. William Gordon and Dr. Donald F. Bittner for their mentorship, sage council, and guidance which allowed me to hone and clarify my thoughts into a presentable product.

Glossary

- **Administrative Control (ADCON)** - Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.†
- **Combined Warfare** - Warfare conducted by forces of two or more allied nations in coordinated action toward common objectives.†
- **Command** - The authority that a commander in the Military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.†
- **Interagency** - United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.†
- **Interagency Coordination** - The coordination that occurs between agencies of the US Government, including the Department of Defense, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.*
- **Joint force** - A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander.†
- **Joint operations** - A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. Operations carried on by two or more of the armed forces.†
- **Operational Control (OPCON)** - Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.†

- **Tactical Control (TACON)** - Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. (Army) — Tactical control allows commanders below combatant command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of logistics assets but does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative and logistical support.†
- **Unified** - For the purposes of this paper, unified connotes joint and interagency.
- **Unified Command** - A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.†
- **Unity of Command** - One of the nine principles of war. All forces operate under one responsible commander who possesses requisite authority to direct forces in pursuit of a common unified purpose.‡
- **Unity of Effort** - Coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, even if the forces are not necessarily part of the same command structure†

†Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

*Joint Publication 3-08: Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization
Coordination During Joint Operations Vol II

‡Field Manual 100-5: Operations

Command relationships are the first and most important thing to be determined... and all else falls into place after that.

– Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Hudson, USMC¹

To ensure a united effort, the ambassador must be a proconsul with absolute authority locally over all policy and agencies.

– Sir Robert Thompson²

Section 1: Introduction

When the city of Rome became a Republic, its people devised a government that would provide for the common good while limiting the power of any single man and empowering the people - the *Senate* led by co-equal *Consules*. As the Roman Republic grew into a global power, however, its people saw the need for a refinement of this government. Within the city of Rome, the government would remain under the care of the *Consules*. But, at the edges of the republic, in the provinces, where immediate and decisive action was called for to defend the borders and promote justice and prosperity, a single man, the *Proconsul*, was required. The *Proconsul* (meaning "acting for the *Consul*") had absolute authority over all activities within his province - military and civilian - and was constrained only by the fact that his performance would be critically judged by the *Senate* upon his return to Rome.³ The United States (U.S.) finds itself in a similar situation as it tries to expand its global influence and should explore the idea of regional *Proconsules*.

With the fallacious "peace dividend" from the resolution of the Cold War expiring, the U.S. is faced with an uncertain future and the need for the commitment to a long war against the elements of instability. The continued success of the U.S. now depends upon defeating trans-national terrorist groups, increasing the number of stable nations with which it fosters economic relationships, and maintaining the capability to defend itself from potentially hostile nations.⁴ To accomplish these goals, the U.S. government is changing its strategy of economic and military

domination to one of engagement and partnership with the international community. In other words, if the U.S. can assist failing, failed, or hostile nations to develop their own effective, democratic, and benevolent governments, U.S. security and prosperity will be assured.⁵ To bring about this difficult transformation against resistant and dynamic powers, the U.S. will need to employ all of its national instruments - diplomatic, economic, military, and informational - in a synchronized and directed manner; it must have unity of action in its overseas programs and operations.

National strategic direction, which is governed by the Constitution, federal law, U.S. Government policy, international law, and national interests, prescribes unified action.⁶ Currently the U.S. attempts to circumvent prerequisite unity of action and pursues its product, unity of effort, through an illusive interagency network of *ad hoc* cooperative relationships. While cooperation may produce coordination, only unity of command - giving a single entity the required responsibility and authority over an objective - guarantees unifies action.⁷

Of the nine principles of war, those traits that have been consistently observed in successful military organizations throughout history,⁸ unity of command is, perhaps, the most important because it allows the organization to develop to its fullest potential.⁹ The desire for unity, however, is not confined to the military. President George W. Bush called for the "integration of effort" in reconstruction and stabilization operations¹⁰ and the RAND Corporation argues that unity of command is as desirable in a nation building and stability operation as it is in war.¹¹

It is understandable, when dealing with a coalition of various governments, that unity of effort may be all that can be striven for. But, within a single nation, whose structure is self-determined, there is no excuse not to achieve unity of command. In addition to unity of

command, the demands of the current environment require the U.S. to have an integrated plan and a unified mechanism for employment. Despite the improvements in interagency coordination and cooperation, there is currently no strategic planning agency, no organization to authoritatively synchronize national efforts, and no unified organization to deliver these efforts. The U.S. Executive Branch should change its fundamental structure at the operational level to achieve integrated planning and regional unity of effort through unified regional executors to synchronize national security programs and operations abroad.

This paper explores the development of the current U.S. government arrangement, examines historical interagency models, and proposes a dramatic shift in the organization of the Executive Branch to achieve true unity of effort through unity of command. Following this introduction, the paper is organized into nine sections. Section 2, *The U.S. Executive Branch*, describes that entity's current organization and functions. Section 3, *The Recurring Need for Unification*, describes how the lack of unity has not been resolved since the Second World War. Section 4, *Attempts to Unify Strategic Effort*, examines examples of initiatives at the Branch level to foster unity. Section 5, *Attempts to Unify Tactical and Operational Effort*, examines examples of modifications to organizations at the country and regional level. Section 6, *Obstacles to Unity of Command*, describes several areas of resistance to change to create unity. Section 7, *Unification: A Proposal*, describes a possible structure that would achieve unity of command at the operational level. Finally, Section 8, *Conclusion*, summarizes the paper's key takeaways.

Section 2: The U.S. Executive Branch

Currently, the U.S. Executive Branch is organized into discrete functions that provide services in a single area of responsibility effectively. Through coordination, this organization

solicits input from the various departments and agencies, defines problems, and devises solutions for the President. The interagency process, while good for discussion and generating options for decision, is woefully inadequate for execution. After the president makes a decision, the process rapidly loses unity. Each department or agency takes its part of the mission back to its "stove-pipe" to plan and execute. Among these various agencies, some of the most significant in terms of overseas national security missions are the State Department, the Defense Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (for a diagram containing all Executive Branch agencies, departments, and government corporations, see Appendix A). The members of any interagency coordination group are not ultimately responsible to the group but to their own agency. No one below the President has the responsibility or authority to ensure the agencies contributions are synchronized or even support each other.¹² This organization lays the entire span of control over all of the numerous departments, agencies, and government corporations on the President's shoulders alone. The President is the only person who is responsible for closing the gaps between programs. Weekly meetings by senior leadership, while important, will not make up for this lack of unified supervision.¹³

As an example, currently in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no command relationship, nominal or otherwise, between the civilian and military sides. This makes civil-military unity of effort highly dependent on the personality of leaders - an uncertain proposition at best. While the U.S. military and civilian leaders in Iraq have worked well together thus far, the key leadership billets change frequently and the successors may not work nearly so well together.¹⁴

The problem with this organization is twofold. The U.S. Executive Branch has no unifying entity below the President to synchronize all the various programs to support a central vision, and there is no entity that has all of the resources necessary to physically fulfill the vision.

The military has the structure and resources to formulate, plan, execute, and supervise operations across most instruments of national power in foreign countries, but lacks the authority and expertise; civilian agencies have the authority and expertise, but lack the structure and resources.

For the Department of Defense, the Unified Combatant Commands are the single entity responsible for the coordination and direction of all military operations and programs within each region or functional area.¹⁵ Although the Department of State has Regional Bureaus, these organizations generate policy and guidance but are not responsible for the actions of the Country Teams (additionally, their regional boundaries do not line up with the Unified Combatant Command areas of responsibility).¹⁶ The other agencies and departments have a similar lack of responsibility. In a time when the U.S. is waging a war against dynamic trans-national groups, there must be greater unity at the regional level to manage cross-border, regional efforts. This unity cannot be achieved through personality based good-will.

Section 3: The Recurring Need for Unification

This was the similar case with the various armed services during World War II where each service provided a unique contribution, but the inter-service rivalries stood in the way of making the whole greater than the sum of its parts. This led to the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), but the division was not solved until Congress intervened and passed the Goldwater-Nichols act in 1986 to unify the armed services under one civilian led command. Opponents of the JCS and the Goldwater-Nichols Act argued that despite perceived splits, the armed forces won WWII. Yes, that war was won, but the forging of joint teams was done informally through personal relationships and force of will. Hoping for the right mix of personalities is not a method to bet future U.S. success on. Before Congress elects to step in again with ideas for reform or the U.S. meets with a catastrophe, the executive branch needs to unify itself.

Section 4: Attempts to Unify Strategic Effort

Many attempts have been made to formalize ad hoc relationships to achieve unity of effort within the executive branch. Most have been ineffective or short-lived. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), the National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC), and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), are a few of these attempts that may provide a useful model.

The Operations Coordinating Board and Foreign Operations Administration

In 1953, seeing that the NSC system lacked any overarching national security planning, directive, and supervisory capability other than himself, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established an Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) to report to the National Security Council and provide integrated implementation of national security policies by the several agencies. The OCB consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, a Presidential representative, the President's Special Assistant for Psychological Strategy, and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

Once the President approved an NSC-recommended national security policy, the OCB would task the various agencies concerned with their detailed operational planning responsibilities, coordinate any interagency aspects of the resulting agency operational plans, ensure that the plans were executed in a timely manner, and supervise the execution to ensure it fulfilled the original national security policy. Additionally, the OCB was to advise the President, and initiate new proposals for national security action in response to opportunity and changes in the situation. In essence, the OCB functioned as the President's general staff for national security and was fully staffed to perform these functions from across the Executive agencies.¹⁷

It is important to note the two entities no longer present at the NSC level: the President's Special Assistant for Psychological Strategy, and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

The Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was created in 1953 as a replacement for the Marshall Plan to serve as a pseudo-colonial administration.¹⁸ Its purpose was "to centralize all governmental operations, as distinguished from policy formulation, that had as their purpose the cooperative development of economic and military strength among the nations of the free world." That function it performed well, but it became regarded by many as merely a temporary entity, established solely to meet certain short-term economic and military requirements following WWII. It was abolished by Executive Order 10610 on 9 May 1955, and its functions were split and transferred to the State Department and the Defense Department.¹⁹

Although the Foreign Operations Administration was abolished, the need for cooperative development of economic and military strength among the world's nations continues. By placing responsibility for economic development within the State Department (and later under the U.S. Administration for International Development) and Foreign Internal Defense within the Defense Department, it was hoped that international cooperation would continue in the long-term.²⁰

These organizations were extremely efficient and effective. President Eisenhower had his Chief of Staff run them similarly to a strategic battle staff. This, of course, led to political infighting in the Congress and the Executive Branch because the "President's cabinet [was] too militaristic." When President Kennedy succeeded President Eisenhower, he immediately abolished the OCB and formed a small, very informal advisory staff within the NSC. Today's organization of the NSC is a direct descendant of the Kennedy model, and Eisenhower's machine is all but forgotten.

The National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees

Issued in 2001, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) - 1, reemphasizing the National Security Act of 1947, defined the role of the National Security Council (NSC) as one of advising and assisting the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy (domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics), and directed it to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies. The actual interagency formulation, coordination, and implementation of national security policies are now accomplished by NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). They also provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President.

There are currently six regional NSC/PCCs (Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa). These are chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank and are designated by the Secretary of State. There are also eleven functional NSC/PCCs that cover issues from terrorism to economics to education. These are also chaired by a person of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank. Seven are chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.²¹

Although these numerous advisory committees are composed of personnel from across the fifteen departments and fifty-six independent establishments and government corporations within the Executive Branch, their members are without directive authority. They make policy recommendations to the NSC and disseminate Presidential policy decisions to their respective agencies. They do not translate strategic vision into strategic goals, conduct strategic planning, or assign tasks to executive agencies.

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability

In an attempt to formalize interagency coordination for foreign government stabilization and reconstruction at the strategic level, President Bush, in NSPD-44, designated the Secretary of State as the lead for coordinating and integrating stabilization and reconstruction efforts among government agencies.²² In response to this directive, the State Department established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This committee is intended to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.²³

Currently, S/CRS has received only minimal funding and the majority of its 80 staff-members and planners have been provided by the Defense Department. Without funding or manning, the S/CRS has little power and, as a new office that does not fit into the hierarchy of the organizational chart, cannot generate any in the face of pre-existing State Department bureaucracy. The Regional Bureaus within State Department do have the power and are possibly the least receptive to this fledgling group. The Assistant Secretaries of the geographic bureaus and offices advise the Secretary of State and guide all operations of the U.S. diplomatic missions within their regional jurisdiction.²⁴ They see the S/CRS as a direct affront to their place between the Secretary of State and the Embassies.

S/CRS has initiated some programs with excellent potential such as the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), that will fill billet vacancies in foreign development groups with experienced civilian volunteers. Likewise the attempt to create an Interagency Planning Process to formalize strategic planning may yield a positive return. Although the theory is sound and its efforts thus

far are admirable, without substantial support and funding from Congress, the S/CRS is yet another organization that will become stuck in committee.

At the departmental level, everyone is in charge and therefore, no one is in charge.²⁵ Below the president, the lines of policy direction, funding, and guidance diverge, never to be reunited except by informal liaison action. With the lack of strategic interagency effectiveness and with real-world contingencies demanding cohesive action, entities at the country and regional levels have devised their own mechanisms for achieving unity of effort.

Section 5: Attempts to Unify Tactical and Operational Effort

Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support

On 9 May 1967, after years of frustration regarding the disparity between the effectiveness of military and civilian operations and a general lack of unity in Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum 362 and established Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).²⁶ Prior to this, various programs were directed nominally by the Ambassador, the Commander, U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (MACV), and the Central Intelligence Agency chief of station with little coordination. CORDS firmly placed all activities, civilian and military under the command of the MACV. The MACV commander had two deputy commanders, one of them a civilian ambassador in charge of pacification, and the other, a three-star general, in charge of operations. Within MACV, there was a single chain of command. Below the deputies, various other civilians and civilian agencies were integrated into the military structure, including an assistant chief of staff for CORDS positioned alongside the traditional military staff. For the first time in U.S. history, civilians were embedded within a wartime command and put in charge of military personnel and resources.

At corps level, the CORDS organization was modeled on that of CORDS at the MACV headquarters. The U.S. military senior adviser, usually a three-star general who also served as the commander of U.S. forces in the region, had a deputy for CORDS (DepCORDS), usually a civilian. The DepCORDS was responsible for the integration and supervision of military and civilian plans in support of the South Vietnamese pacification program within the corps area, and advised the commander on how best to synchronize and integrate "large-unit" military operations with pacification operations.²⁷

Province advisory teams in the corps area of responsibility, led by either a military officer or a civilian, depending on the security situation of the respective province, reported directly to the Corps DepCORDS. These teams, composed of both U.S. military and civilian personnel, were responsible for advising the Vietnamese province chief about civil-military aspects of the South Vietnamese pacification and development programs, facilitated area and community development (including public health and administration, civil affairs, education, agriculture, psychological operations, and logistics), and assisting with military issues (such as helping the province staff prepare plans and direct security operations by the territorial forces and associated support within the province).²⁸

Despite initial resistance and a lack of similar structure in Washington and along fiscal lines, CORDS met its goal of unifying all pacification efforts under one commander. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign, a successful example of interagency cooperation, was built upon the foundation of CORDS. It attempted to coordinate all war efforts under one coherent operational plan to attack the enemy's center of gravity (his political organization and his control of the population), and achieved most of its success criteria.²⁹ Though CORDS offers a solid

operational model for achieving unity of effort, it was solely under military control and to be successful, it still relied heavily on the amicable cooperation of differing egos and personalities.

U.S. Defense Department Africa Command

Without a powerful regional entity with the authority and resources to coordinate all activities, the Department of Defense has begun the adaptation of the Unified Combatant Command structure and responsibilities to fill that void. In February 2007, President Bush established a new Unified Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) to better coordinate its own military and security activities in Africa as well as integrate with the work of other U.S. government agencies, particularly the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.³⁰ To accomplish this coordination and integration, AFRICOM has a unique structure within the Department of Defense. A structure that is very reminiscent of CORDS. The commander has two co-equal deputy commanders. One, the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA), is a senior civilian diplomat who directs the command's plans and programs associated with health, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian mine action, disaster response, and security sector reform. The other, the Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO), is a three-star general who directs military operations.³¹ Additionally, half of the directorates are headed by civilians and roughly half of the commands personnel are from government agencies outside of the Defense Department.

This structure has the appearance of being a unified command that has the authority and resources to employ all the instruments of national power, essentially, "taking all of those activities that are already being done and consolidating them all under one command."³² Unfortunately, it is still a Defense Department entity and does not have the authority to dictate to the other Executive Branch Departments. The personnel from other departments are merely

advisors and liaison for their parent agency. It could be argued that AFRICOM has the resources, but these, especially in the financial arena, are from emergency appropriations designed for Iraq and Afghanistan and are not permanent and can not be used outside of the theater for which they were created. Without legal resources and authority, AFRICOM appears to have begun a move by the Defense Department to take over the execution of foreign affairs from the State Department. In his confirmation hearing, General "Kip" Ward, the AFRICOM Commander, stated that, "AFRICOM is focused on Title 22 activities..." the purview of the State Department. With the best intentions, AFRICOM is verging on improperly intervening in politics and policy formulation.

Section 6: Obstacles to Unity of Command

All the attempts above are based upon trying to approximate unity of command through cooperative means (if unity of command cannot be attained, the next best thing is unity of effort). The root of the problem is still a lack of absolute unity, and a perception that such unity may not be desirable. What is needed is to address the problem at its core. Why does the Executive Branch not already possess unity of command? The first reason is that there are vast differences between the philosophies of control and responsibility among the executive departments. The second reason is the argument over civilian control of the military. The third reason is the parochial defense of rice bowls and bureaucratic unwillingness or inability to adapt.

Differences in Philosophies of Control and Responsibility

Philosophies of control and responsibility differ widely among the Executive Departments and Agencies. The differences boil down to the fulfillment of policy and guidance versus orders. A military officer who fails to obey a lawful order will meet with immediate and severe consequences.³³ This immediacy quickly builds a culture of personal responsibility. In

contrast, while a military commander may be relieved on the spot, it takes at least one year of scrupulous documentation, counseling, and re-training to relieve a civilian federal employee.³⁴ Given the amount of effort required, the time involved, and the defense of ignorance, it is relatively easy to ignore policy with impunity (or simply wait out an unpopular policy). Even within a culture of personal responsibility, such as the Marine Corps, officers frequently ignore policy until it is reiterated as a Marine Corps Order. A simplified example of how this philosophy adversely affects an organization can be found in the Department of State. The President makes an executive decision (an order) and the Secretary of State and involved Regional Bureau provide guidance and policy regarding the President's order to the Chief of Mission. The Chief of Mission, upon receiving this guidance may dismiss it and communicate directly with the President for instructions or pursue an independent course of action and wait for a possible reprimand or removal. In the intervening levels of bureaucracy between the President and the Chief of Mission there is no one with the responsibility to ensure the President's policy is executed. In stark contrast to the State Department, the Secretary of Defense advises the president in the formulation of policy, transmits that policy to the Geographic Combatant Commands who in turn translate policy and exercise command. Guidance and policy are adequate for slow-moving peace-time initiatives, but in an evolving and dynamic conflict, command becomes imperative.

Civilian Control of the Military

The contemporary view among many military leaders is that war has become too complex (preparations too elaborate, weapons too sophisticated, command too arduous, and operations too intricate) to leave its execution to anyone but professionals. Current law reinforces this view by excluding personnel assigned to Unified Combatant Commands from the

control of Chiefs of Mission.³⁵ This assertion is dangerous and is contrary to the intentions of the framers of the American Constitution who saw civilian control as a prerequisite for a stable, liberal democracy. Given that broad strategic decisions have a significant impact on U.S. citizens, they are best guided by the will of the people, rather than left solely to military officers.³⁶ The military serves as a special government agency, which is supposed to implement, rather than formulate, policies that require the use of certain types of physical force, and is therefore, subordinate to civilian control.³⁷

The military also fears a loss of tempo would result from having a civilian in charge. The civilian, unused to the dynamics of combat may form committees and panels to discuss and debate decisions. No military activity (other than immediate self defense) would be initiated without approval by such a council. The same would be true of police operations, reconstruction, and intelligence gathering. While war by committee is anathema in high-intensity conflict, where shock, speed, and surprise are generally paramount, this is not the case in the partnership and engagement operations the U.S. expects to conduct for the foreseeable future. Here consistency and close coordination are more important. Even if this might entail the loss of some short-term efficiency, it will be more than compensated for by gains in long-term effectiveness.³⁸

Parochial Defense of Rice Bowls

Bureaucratic programs, by nature, are hostile to efforts to change their hierarchical status, funding, and purview. A change in a program connotes to the bureaucracy that there were errors made in the past - an unacceptable proposition in the political realm. Additionally, in the current "stove-piped" Executive Branch organization, subordinating any agency to another is met with a flurry of political activity to maintain the status quo. This phenomenon is most evident in

entities that have been expanding influence and are being put back in line. Just as it took legislation and two decades to force the armed services to change, it will take a similar Herculean effort to change the executive departments. This paper does not address the machinations to bring about this change, but only the form the resulting organization should assume.

Section 7: Unification: A Proposal

None of the models discussed thus far have provided for true unity of effort. Perhaps by looking not at U.S. models, but at models other western democracy have used, an operational remedy may be derived. In the British Empire and the later Commonwealth, Great Britain appointed a single person to administer all activities, military and civil, within a colony - the Viceroy (this term should not be confused with the Governor General for self-governing dominions such as Australia and Canada). The Viceroy was either a senior diplomat, usually with military experience, or a senior military commander. Responsibility, authority, and very importantly, the control of financial purse strings were wielded by this one individual who answered directly to Whitehall. This model not only provides unity of effort but, in actuality, unity of command. Although not imperial or colonial in function or intent, the U.S. should adopt a similar organization at the operational and tactical levels.

Change at the Strategic Level

To facilitate this significant shift at the operational level, the Executive Branch, at the strategic level, must create a planning and supervisory staff charged with translating strategic vision into strategic goals, assigning tasks, and ensuring timely and appropriate execution. This structure must be composed of members of all the executive departments, agencies, and government corporations. This staff should be similarly structured to the OCB of the

Eisenhower Administration and report to the President and NSC. Above all, this staff must have the ability to issue directives and plan operations rather than being merely a forum for debate. This will be uncomfortable for some agencies involved, as they will be ceding individual agency autonomy to a committee, but such sacrifice is absolutely necessary to create the unity, flexibility, and decisiveness needed for the ongoing conflict.

Shift from Emphasis on Functional Lines to Regional Lines

Currently, the U.S. conducts operations and programs along functional lines with coordination between these functions. With the threat of trans-national terrorist and criminal organizations that do not reside in one sovereign state but across borders, a regional approach to fight these organizations must be adopted. The traditional functional orientation must shift to unified regional operations with coordination between regions (a shift similar to the development of UCCs). This orientation will provide for strong relationships between the regions because functional members in different regions will come from the same department. Additionally, the State Department's Regional Bureaus should be aligned with the UCC Areas of Responsibility. This may require new regional boundaries to be drawn to account for all aspects of foreign policy, but will lessen the seams between that must be coordinated across. To unify the entire Executive Branch, the internal federal security of the U.S. should also be merged under one region (an empowered Homeland Security Department).

Certain functional organizations which provide global resourcing should be retained or created. These cross-regional functional entities (e.g. transportation, logistics and supply, personnel sourcing, etc.) should be similar to the Defense Department's Functional UCCs. They should draw upon all departments and agencies to coordinate and provide support to the regions.

Appoint Single Manager (Unified Regional Executor)

The U.S. Unified Regions (USUR) and U.S. Unified Functions (USUF) will exercise the authority and responsibility to direct all operations and programs within their region of responsibility or function (similar to Combatant Command). The USUR will be managed by a civilian Cabinet level Unified Regional Executor (URE). The URE would lead a unified staff and be empowered to direct employees in all assigned agencies in accomplishing the mission for the President.³⁹ The Chain of Command should be from the President directly to the Regional Executor.

The URE should be proposed by the NSC, nominated by the President, and confirmed by the U.S. Congress in a process similar to that of UCCs. Unlike current subjective qualification guidelines for Ambassadors,⁴⁰ however, a potential URE must have qualifications similar to those of a Combatant Commander.⁴¹ Specifically, a URE must have a great understanding and experience with the civilian and military operations and programs in addition to practical knowledge of the region. Prospective UREs will need to be grown and groomed to acquire this prerequisite experience through education and tours throughout the Executive Branch agencies.

Expand Joint Componenty

The Executive Branch should expand the model and terminology of joint componenty to all its departments, agencies, and government corporations (for a complete explanation of joint componenty, see Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, or Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 0-1.1: Componenty). To explain the proposed structure, the pairing of similar relationships will highlight the parallels between the proposed unified structure and current joint structure. The NSC retains the role of policy generation and advice similar to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A newly formed OCB would conduct planning

and supervision similar to the Joint Staff. The various departments and agencies would fulfill roles similar to the Uniformed Services (i.e. organize, man, train, and equip units to be employed by proposed Unified Regions). Command relationships between components would be the same as currently used by the joint community (OPCON, TACON, ADCON, Supported, and Supporting). The Secretaries would maintain ADCON and develop and promulgate policy affecting their functions. A Unified Region (UR) or Unified Function (UF) would exercise authority similar to Combatant Command for all U.S. departments and agencies within its area of responsibility.

This organization provides unity of command while simultaneously generating a system of checks and balances within the unified structure. The URE is the arbitrator between assigned departmental components within the UR or UF. When a departmental component disagrees with a URE decision, then that component has the responsibility to report the issue through departmental channels back to the NSC or OCB for resolution.

Modify Funding

In tandem with the shift from functional to regional lines, the financial lines must be realigned. The departments would be required to grow capabilities to support the USURs. In order to provide the USURs with the capabilities they are asking for, the President would need to prioritize in his budgetary process, and Congress would need to fund, the departments appropriately.⁴² Money to man, train, and equip components should be managed by the departments, while money for programs and operations is appropriated to the UR or UF.

Provide a Full-Time Staff

Similarly to UCCs, each UR and UF must have a unified staff to assist the URE in carrying out assigned responsibilities. Positions of responsibility on the unified staff should be

filled by members from each of the departments having significant personnel assigned to the UR or UF in addition to subject matter experts from the private sector.⁴³ This unified staff should translate strategic goals into operational objectives and task subordinate unified entities. The staff would conduct regional planning and direct programs and operations within the region in accordance with policy and directives from the President through the NSC and OCB.

Source "Forces"

To support this change, Executive Departments must develop and maintain personnel and organizations capable of deploying in support of U.S. initiatives and providing their departmental services on foreign soil. The call for a Civilian Reserve Corps is a good first step in the process of creating this capability and should be expanded and properly funded. The UR and UF should build component organizations, with the capability to achieve objectives, in a similar fashion to how UCCs currently create forces, through Requests for Forces to the departments. The departments source these components for use by the UR or UF. For example, a UCC would be a component under the UR. The Unified Personnel Function coordinates sourcing in a way similar to the current Joint Forces Command.

Civilians and military personnel must also spend tours in other agencies. This will let the people understand the culture in another agency and how to work with those people. There must also be an education component to the unified structure. The National Defense University and other military schools should increase the number of civilian attendees, while other schools specifically created to instruct on non-military curricula would round-out this unified educational process. The most dramatic change to the Federal system would be the requirement for new legislation that would require the obedience to lawful orders (similar to the Uniform Code of

Military Justice) for all federal employees and an adjustment in the Performance Appraisal Review System to include "loss of confidence" criteria.

Appoint Unified Sub-Regional and Country Executors

The unified structure must extend down to the sub-regional and country levels for unity of command to work. As evidenced by the CORDS example, if unity does not extend all the way from the tactical unit to the President, there will not be unity of effort throughout in the Executive Branch. Sub-regional entities should have structures similar to URs with the responsibility to a narrower area. Within a given country, the current loose Country Team structure is as weak as it was in the Vietnam War before CORDS was created and empowered.⁴⁴ A country viceroy is required. The Unified Country Executor (UCE), an Ambassador, must have command authority for all U.S. government personnel in the country. At the country level, several scenarios must be explored.

For a stable country with good governance and an established U.S. Embassy, a civilian Ambassador would remain the Chief of Mission. The Ambassador would execute programs and operations to fulfill goals established by the OCB and Region. Military forces deployed to a country for Foreign Internal Defense missions or training would be subordinate to the Ambassador. This does not create a dilemma because the Ambassador, as well as the military force, executes the orders of the URE. Additionally, to become an Ambassador, an individual will need to have diverse qualifications similar to a URE to be confirmed. If the government of a country with a U.S. Embassy fails, the UR may shift the Chief of Mission to a military commander as the situation warrants until such time as is required to reestablish full diplomatic intercourse.

For a country with no U.S. Embassy or Consulate, the Chief of Mission (and a nominal staff) would reside at the Region and serve as a planner and duty expert. This Chief of Mission may be civilian or military. In the case where intervention (either conflict or natural disaster) is warranted, the military should provide the necessary security to allow the relief and reconstruction to proceed. In this case the Chief of Mission should be a military commander. Once the situation has stabilized enough to stand up an embassy, the Chief of Mission can be transferred to a civilian Ambassador.

While this organization could be expanded to include the entire Executive Branch, this paper focuses on those activities that directly contribute to national security and does not delve specifically into those domestic activities that indirectly contribute or to the requirement for international cooperation. The U.S. will still need to generate unity of effort within the international community, but a unified U.S. entity will be much easier to coordinate with.


Section 8: Conclusion

The structure needed to fight a long war against the forces of instability must provide several capabilities. It must provide single direction, enforce the primacy of the political effort over military power, achieve unity of effort, and promote the adaptation of attitudes and capabilities across military and civilian components. The current U.S. government organization does not provide for these.

The U.S. Executive Branch must create a unified strategic planning and supervisory organization, unify operations and programs under authoritative regional executors, realign federal funding, and empower Chiefs of Mission within assigned countries. The proposed structure fulfills these goals and offers exceptional agility to shift from stability and possible confrontation to conflict and back again. This approach does not add to the bureaucracy, it

simplifies it. Resources are provided to the entity that can best utilize them within the priorities established by the President. The recommendations above do require a significant adjustment to current philosophies and organizations and minor modifications to numerous sections of the United States Code. Additionally, a huge shift in attitude must occur for agencies to overcome the feeling they are being demoted, similar to how the uniformed services felt in 1986.

In the uncertain world of the future, the only variable that the U.S. government can control with certainty is how it organizes itself; the enemy can affect virtually every other facet. While no structure will guarantee victory, no amount of good-will will overcome the flaws of an unmanageable structure. Failing to get the structure right will undermine all other efforts, while successful organization will provide incalculable benefits to ensure U.S. national security is maintained abroad.



Notes

- ¹ Then LtCol Hudson, now a BGen, said this to Conference Group 6 of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College on 24 March 2003 (recorded by Dr. Donald Bittner).
- ² Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1972), 157.
- ³ Tim J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 b.c.), (London: Routledge, Routledge History of the Ancient World, 1995), 370.
- ⁴ George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy, (The White House, Washington D.C.: GPO, 2006).
- ⁵ Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: Book II - 1776, (repub., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976), 208-209. The role of government in a free society is to provide security from external threats, security from internal threats, and the erection and maintenance of public works.
- ⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2008), II-3.
- ⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, A-2.
- ⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, II-1.
- ⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), 4-14.
- ¹⁰ George W. Bush, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," National Security Presidential Directive-44, (the White House, Washington, D.C., 7 December 2005).
- ¹¹ James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2007), 22.
- ¹² Garamone, Jim, "Discussion Needed to Change Interagency Process, Pace Says," (Armed Forces Information Service News Articles, September 17, 2004). As of February 15, 2006:
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09172004_2004091704.html>
- ¹³ Austin Long, On "Other War" Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research, (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2006), 59-60.
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf>
- ¹⁴ Austin Long, "Coordination Could Breed Control in Iraq," Commentary, (RAND Corp., 24 January 2007),
<<http://www.rand.org/commentary/012407WP.html>> (28 January 2008)
- ¹⁵ U.S.C., Title 10, § 164.
- ¹⁶ Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
<<http://www.state.gov/p/>> (20 January 2008)
- ¹⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Establishing the Operations Coordinating Board," Executive Order 10483, the White House, Washington, D.C., 2 September, 1953.
- ¹⁸ Harry S. Truman, "Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953," the White House, Washington, D.C., 12 June 1953.
- ¹⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Administration of Mutual Security and Related Functions," Executive Order 10483, the White House, Washington, D.C., 9 May 1955.
- ²⁰ John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Letter to Secretary Dulles Regarding Transfer of the Affairs of the Foreign Operations Administration to the Department of State, 17 April 1955," The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database).
<<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10454>>
- ²¹ George W. Bush, "Organization of the National Security Council System," National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), the White House, Washington, D.C., 13 February 2001.
- ²² George W. Bush, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," National Security Presidential Directive-44, the White House, Washington, D.C., 7 December 2005.
- ²³ U.S. Department of State, About S/CRS, 18 May 2006,
<<http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>> (11 January 2008)
- ²⁴ "Under Secretary for Political Affairs," <<http://www.state.gov/p/>>, (15 January 2008).
- ²⁵ Robert W. Komer, 75.
- ²⁶ Johnson to Komer, National Security Action Memorandum 362, Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development),
<<http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMalnsem362.asp>> (15 November 2007).

- ²⁷ Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 93.
- ²⁸ Richard Hunt, 94.
- ²⁹ Lewis Sorely, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999), 194.
- ³⁰ Vince Crawley, "U.S. Creating New Africa Command To Coordinate Military Efforts," USINFO, Bureau of International Information Programs, 6 February 2007, <<http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/February/20070206170933MVyelwarC0.2182581.html>> (10 Jan 2008).
- ³¹ "Biography: Mary Carlin Yates, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, United States Africa Command," <<http://www.africom.mil/yates.asp>> (18 January 2008).
- ³² Vince Crawley
- ³³ Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, Manual for Courts-Martial United States (2008 Edition), (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2008), IV-25.
- ³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, DoD 1400.25-M Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Manual, Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996, 430-1. This document governs policy within the Defense Department but fulfills the policy mandated for the entire Executive Branch in: Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better & Costs Less, (Washington D.C.: National Performance Review), 1993.
- ³⁵ U.S.C., Title 22, § 3927.
- ³⁶ John Hampden Jackson, Clemenceau and the Third Republic, (New York: McMillan, 1948), 228. *La guerre! C'est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires.*
- ³⁷ Richard H. Kohn, "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military," (American Diplomacy, 1997), <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html> (10 January 2008).
- ³⁸ Long, 58.
- ³⁹ Garamone, Jim, "Discussion Needed to Change Interagency Process, Pace Says," Armed Forces Information Service News Articles, September 17, 2004. As of February 15, 2006: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09172004_2004091704.html>
- ⁴⁰ U.S.C. Title 22, § 3944.
- ⁴¹ U.S.C. Title 10, § 164.
- ⁴² OMB's Mission, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization/role.html>> (13 January 2008)
- ⁴³ U.S.C. Title 10, § 164.
- ⁴⁴ Robert W. Komer, 157.
- ⁴⁵ U.S. Federal Government, <http://bensguide.gpo.gov/files/gov_chart.pdf> (13 January 2008)

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